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The remaining life assessment (RLA) process is a reliability prediction process, 
which predicts amount of life left in a system. Remaining life assessment is 
performed on hardware, which has already seen operational life. This thesis 
details the remaining life assessment process in detail and also provides a case 
study of remaining life assessment performed on the Shuttle Remote Manipulator 
System (SRMS). The electronics of Shuttle Remote Manipulator System was 
designed in the 1970s with a target application life of ten years. They have 
performed without any failures for over 20 years. The remaining life assessment 
process was done to investigate if the life of the SRMS could be extended until 
the year 2020. The remaining life assessment concluded that the electronics could 
ii  
be extended until 2020 due to the robust design and lack of damage caused to the 
assemblies. 
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1 Background and Motivation 
Maintaining the reliability of electronic products is a major concern for companies 
because the failure to do so can lead to huge financial losses. For e.g., Toshiba corp. 
agreed to a  $1.1 billion settlement for allegedly selling defective laptop computers in the 
U.S., the first fallout from a wave of lawsuits and government inquiries over a flaw that 
may be common to the products of many major computer makers1. This thesis is an 
attempt at improving the reliability process by developing a reliability prediction process 
called Remaining Life Assessment (RLA). The Remaining Life Assessment (RLA) 
process is a reliability prediction process, which predicts amount of life left in a system. 
Remaining life assessment can be done on systems, which have seen a considerable 
amount of life. This thesis presents the RLA approach through the case study of the RLA 
of Space Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS). The RLA process can help in the 
improving the reliability of electronics systems by being able to detect failures and causes 
of failure that would occur in the systems exposed under certain life cycle conditions. 
The remaining life assessment process is to certain extent a derivation of PoF process 
developed and used by CALCE. The Computer Aided Life Cycle Engineering (CALCE) 
Center at the University of Maryland developed a PoF approach for electronic product 
qualification and accelerated testing in the early 1990s. The PoF approach utilizes 
knowledge of the life-cycle load profile, package architecture, and material properties in 
identifying potential failure mechanisms and provides a rational method of analysis and 
testing to predict expected life cycles in the field application (1-5). Physics of failure 
(PoF) supplies the link between failures under normal use conditions and the failures 
taking place during the accelerated tests. PoF establishes a qualitative and quantitative 
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relationship between the particular failure mechanisms, the product properties, and 
environmental conditions.  
All the research for the project (RLA of SRMS) has been performed in CALCE-UMCP 
(University of Maryland College park). The sponsor of the project was MD Robotics 
(MDR), Canada. All the information about SRMS has been provided by MDR. 
1.1 Space Shuttle Remote Manipulator System 
This section introduces the case study material i.e. Space Shuttle Remote Manipulator 
System (SRMS, Figure 1-1). Since its maiden voyage aboard U.S. Space Shuttle 
Columbia in 1981, the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS), known as 
Canadarm, has demonstrated its reliability, usefulness, and versatility and has provided 
strong, yet precise and delicate handling of its payloads. Canadarm was designed, 
developed and built by Spar Space Systems Robotics operation, now MD Robotics under 
contract to the National Research Council of Canada. The first arm was Canada’s 
contribution to NASA’s Space Shuttle Program.  Subsequently, NASA ordered four 
additional units.  Canadarm has performed flawlessly for 20 years; placing satellites into 
their proper orbit and retrieving malfunctioning ones for repair. Perhaps its most notable 
mission was the repair of the Hubble Space Telescope. Canadarm was used as a mobile 
work platform for astronauts during numerous space walks required to repair the faulty 
telescope. Canadarm played a critical role retrieving the satellite, placing it in the cargo 
bay for repairs, and then re-deploying it.  Unplanned exercises for Canadarm have 
included knocking a block of ice from a clogged waste-water vent that might have 
endangered the shuttle upon re-entry, pushing a faulty antenna into place, and 
successfully activating a satellite that failed to go into proper orbit.  In December 1998 
Canadarm played a critical role in the first assembly mission of the International Space 
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Station, mating the U. S. Unity node to the Russian-built Zarya. Canadarm will continue 
to play a vital role in the assembly of the space station.  The Shuttle Remote Manipulator 
System consists of a shoulder, elbow and wrist joint separated by an upper and lower arm 
boom. The shoulder joint has two degrees of freedom, the elbow joint has one degree of 
freedom, and the wrist joint has up to three degrees of freedom.  At a total weight of 
approximately 905 lbs., the Canadarm has recently been upgraded to maneuver payloads 
of up to 266,000 kgs. (in the weightlessness of space). Canadarm uses an end effector 
with a specially designed grapple fixture to place payloads in orbit. 
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Figure 1-1: SRMS 
1.2 Why RLA of SRMS and hardware chosen for RLA 
The successor to the Space Shuttle, the second-generation Reusable Launch Vehicle 
(RLV), is not expected to be ready before 2020 and hence NASA hopes to extend the 
usage of the Space Shuttles into the year 2020. NASA has asked its major contractors to 
conduct remaining life assessment of the key components of the Space Shuttle, since 
MDR manufactures SRMS it was asked to do the RLA of SRMS.  
Figure 1-2 shows the physical hierarchy of the SRMS. There are many systems and sub 
systems in the SRMS as observed from the physical hierarchy diagram. Since it is not 
possible that all the systems be analyzed for RLA. The EEEU was chosen as a 
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representative of the remaining life of the SRMS. The EEEU was chosen because boards 
in the EEEU experience the most harsh of all environmental conditions and they had the 
highest number of components per boards. However the EEEU units are still being used 
in the SRMS and hence physical analysis step of the RLA couldn’t be performed. Hence 
as a physical representative of EEEU, SPA unit was chosen. 
Similarities between the SPA and EEEU are: 
 SPA boards are similar to EEEU in terms of board layers (same number of layers 
and board materials), components, size, and exposure to similar testing (thermal, 
vibration) conditions. 
 The EEEU and some of the SPA units are in close proximity to each other in the 
SRMS, therefore the life cycle loads that contribute to damage to the boards affect 
both similarly.  
 The two units were designed and manufactured at the same time using same 
design rules and following the same standards.  
 The test schedules for the two units are similar. 
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Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS)












Power Switch Driver Off Board
8 more boards
Figure 1-2: Physical hierarchy of the SRMS 
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2 Steps In Remaining Life Assessment Process 
2.1 Physical analysis of assemblies 
Physical analysis is the first step of the remaining life assessment process, as required by 
the RLA process the hardware available for physical analysis, needs to have been in 
operation for a certain period of time. The hardware may be present either in the form of 
acomplete assembly or just the boards may be available for analysis. In the event of the 
presence of a assembly, first a tear down has to be performed and the boards have to be 
separated out. The tear down process has its importance in the fact that it is possible to 
analyze the working dimensions and tolerance and based on teardown experience it is 
possible to make improvements for future designs. Physical analysis gives an opportunity 
to evaluate other damages and deteriorations that may be caused by the environmental 
effects not accounted for in simulation processes. Tear down, visual inspection and 
destructive physical analysis formed the part of physical analysis process step of RLA. 
2.1.1 Investigation of degradation, quality in assemblies through non 
destructive means 
After the tear down is performed on the assembly visual inspection is performed on the 
boards. The visual inspection process helps to identify externally observable anomalies. 
Visual inspection may be performed by the naked eye or with the help of an optical 
microscope or sometimes an X-ray microscope. Visual inspection helps in identifying 
failures like large cracks ,voids or wiredebonding which are evident.  E.g., the lead frame 
stamping process leaves residual stresses and sharp blurs that act as stress concentrators. 
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2.1.2 Investigation of degradation in assemblies through destructive physical 
analysis 
Destructive physical analysis is done on boards to detect internal anomalies. Destructive 
physical analysis can only be performed after it is made sure that the visual inspection 
process is complete and all the external anomalies are detected. 
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2.1.3 Degradation assessment and identify loads causing failures 
 
Based on the external and internal anomalies observed, it is possible to characterize if the 
anomalies occurred during manufacturing or during operation.  A reverse engineering 
type of approach can be done to investigate anomalies and find out the loads that are 
responsible for the anomalies. 
2.2 Life cycle environment profile (LCEP) 
To investigate the cause of failures that occur during the life cycle of the electronics it is 
imperative to   accurately characterize that the stress loads experienced during its life. 
Through the development of accurate Life Cycle Environment Profile (LCEP) based on 
10 
 
the events that take place in the life of electronics it is possible to identify loads, which 
act on the electronics. A life cycle environment profile (LCEP) is a forecast of events and 
associated environmental conditions that equipment will experience from manufacture to 
end of life. A life cycle environment profile helps to identify all possible load 
combinations so that the stresses acting on the product can be identified and can be 
incorporated in the product’s design, test and qualification process to ensure the 
reliability of the electronic equipment for its entire life. Past research describes the need 
for life cycle analysis of electronic products in order to ensure product reliability[3]-[6]. 
The failure modes and mechanisms can be identified for each load which helps in 
improving the design by providing safeguards against failures for present systems and 
designing for better reliability in future systems. Environmental loads corresponding to 
manufacture and assembly, testing, handling, shipping, storage before and/or between 
usage, operation and rework are accounted for in the LCEP. 
Importance of creating a LCEP is: 
• Design engineers faced with the task of effective design need to provide 
safeguards against failure causing loads. LCEP can help identify the failure 
causing loads. 
• Reliability Engineers encountering failures would like to get to the root cause of 
problems to weed them out. LCEP can identify life-threatening loads and from the 
loads it is possible to identify the failure modes and mechanisms. A comparison 
can be made of the failures observed with anticipated failures and hence root 
cause of failures can be identified.  
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• Not all environments merit consideration in determining the reliability of each 
product many are below the practical threshold for each part because the 
environment are sufficiently benign or because the inherent characteristics of the 
product are not susceptible to the stresses associated with the environment. 
Through LCEP it is possible to estimate the potential damage which can be 
caused by each load. E.g., Space electronics may be stored for long periods under 
benign temperatures which may have no effect on the electronics.  
• If a LCEP is prepared for a particular system, then the same LCEP can be used for 
qualifying other systems manufactured in the future. E.g., A LCEP created for 
space electronics may show high operational temperatures. Using this temperature 
profile it is possible to qualify future space electronics by making them undergo 
testing at the temperatures and also providing safeguards. Hence the electronics 
used in the future are more reliable than previous ones. 
The steps in developing an LCEP are as follows: 
2.2.1 Define life cycle environment and associated load conditions 
Describe the expected events occurring from manufacture to end of life. This step called 
as the LCEP step. For example, in the case of a space shuttle , these events or phases 
include assembly, qualification, , transportation to launch site, storage at the launch pad, 
launch, operation and rework. The entire life cycle of the electronic product should be 
separated into the key phases or events. The events are generally decided based on the 
commonality of loads acting on the system for a particular duration.  
2.2.2 Identify life cycle loads  
Identify the significant loads (temperature, vibration) from LCEP. Identify failure modes 
and mechanisms for each load.  Use the listing of the failure modes and mechanisms as   
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ameans for improving reliability. For e.g., during qualification testing the space 
assemblies are subjected to temperature cycling. During temperature cycle testing, 
products are held at cold temperature long enough to establish temperature stabilization 
and appropriate creep and stress relaxation of materials. Following this cold dwell 
materials are heated to the hot dwell where they remain for another minimum time 
period. The dwell at each extreme and two transition times constitute one cycle. Common 
failure modes include parametric shifts and catastrophic failures; common failure 
mechanisms include wirebonds fatigue, cracked or lifted dies, and package failure. 
 
2.3 FMEA  
A FMEA is a qualitative technique for determining and listing the possible failure modes, 
by which the product may fail.  FMEA involves an analysis of the system to determine 
the effect of component or subsystem failure on the overall performance of the system 
and on the ability to meet performance requirements or objectives [42].  Based on the 
captured design and loading conditions, the possible failure modes and mechanisms are 
identified.  A literature search or knowledge from similar existing products can aid in 
identification of possible mechanisms and modes. A FMEA is generally constructed in a 
table format.  The major components or subsystems of the product are listed in the first 
column.  The physical failure modes for each component are listed in the second column.  
In the third column the possible failure mechanisms are identified for each respective 
entry in columns one and two.  The effects of the failure on the product are listed in the 
fourth column.  Additional columns containing failure probability, criticality, or 
alternative failure ranking, determined from previous product knowledge, may be 
included for a more quantitative analysis.  Likewise, columns listing symptoms or 
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methods of failure detection may be listed to help identify specific failure modes and 
mechanisms.  For example, an FMEA of surface mount components assembled to a PWB 
under temperature cycling, may identify an electrical open as a failure mode due to 
thermomechanical fatigue mechanism.  
2.4 Virtual remaining life assessment 
Virtual remaining life assessment is performed to determine the remaining life at the 
circuit card assembly level. Virtual remaining life assessment  is basically a simulation 
process where electronics are simulated under various life threatening loads . Software 
that can be used for VRLA are ansys, abacus, calcePWA etc. 
2.4.1 Design Capture  
Design capture is the process of identifying and documenting geometrical, material, and 
mounting information to generate a model of the physical hardware. Design capture 
involves evaluating the electronic system at all hierarchies (e.g., enclosure, circuit cards, 
parts, physical interfaces) based on the objectives of the assessment. Each individual 
component of the CCA is characterized by a set of geometrical and material parameters 
by the hardware capture and material identification and properties. Geometric data for a 
product is generally defined by the product’s manufacturer by means of design drawings 
or electronic design files. Information may be obtained from the manufacturer, 
conducting reverse engineering, or by making reasonable assumptions based on literature 
and prior experience. Information such as component and interconnect geometry, circuit 
card geometry, and mounting conditions are needed for a model of the hardware.  The 
identification of materials used in the construction of the electronic product is needed to 
understand the behavior of the materials and their failure response when subjected to 
loads in PoF. The material properties define how a material will react and degrade due to 
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loads applied during manufacture, assembly, storage, transportation, installation, rework, 
and operation. 
2.4.2 Life cycle environment and operation assessment 
Environmental and operational loads are applied to models of the product, created from 
the hardware capture, to determine the maximum stress areas in the product.  During the 
stress assessment, the global loads experienced at the system level, are transformed to 
local loads throughout the product. The local loads are used to determine the potential 
failure sites. Te damage assessment utilizes the local loads (e.g., temperature at a 
component, curvature of the PWB below a component) found in the stress assessment 
and determines the time-to-failure of each failure site based on the failure mechanisms of 
interest. Since the same load can excite more than one failure mechanism, damage 
models representing the various mechanisms are used to estimate the time-to-failure for 
each failure mechanism. Likewise, multiple loads may excite the same failure 
mechanisms; therefore load interaction toward a failure mechanism must be considered 
when conducting the damage assessment. Models representing multiple load interactions 
should be used when available, even when a model is not available, the product’s 
response to the multiple loads must be identified. 
 
2.4.3 Failure Risk assessment: 
Each failure site is ranked in terms of time-to-failure based on the results of the damage 
assessment for each failure mechanism in the life assessment.  An initial reliability 
assessment is made based on the shortest time-to-failure. 
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2.5 Accelerated testing 
Accelerated testing is conducting to cause the life aging process of products to occur at a 
rate faster than would be obtained under normal operating conditions. The steps involved 
in accelerated testing include the following: 
1. Determine acceleration loads and duration of tests 
2. Perform accelerated testing and analyze results 
Care must be taken in specifying the accelerated conditions so that the failure modes and 
failure mechanisms are neither introduced nor removed. Excessive acceleration of a 
failure mechanism may trigger a failure mechanism that that may be dominant at service 
loads. This failure mechanism shifting may provide misleading service life predictions. 
Each stress may also cause multiple failure mechanisms to be accelerated with different 
sensitivities. For e.g., Temperature accelerates electromigration, ionic contamination and 
surface charge spreading but at different rates. Conversely a particular failure mechanism 
may be activated by multiple stresses.  For e.g., corrosion is accelerated by temperature 
and humidity. In light of these complexities accelerated testing should not be employed 
without a thorough understanding of how the test correlates with service conditions. 
Table 2-1 gives examples of failure mechanisms and acceleration parameters. 
Table 2-1: Failure mechanisms and acceleration parameters 
Failure mechanisms Acceleration parameters 
Failure crack initiation • Step load or displacement  
• Thermal shock 
 
Fatigue crack propagation • Cyclic load displacement and 
temperature 
Diffusion • Absolute temperature 
• Concentration gradient 
Interdiffusion  • Absolute and cyclic temperature 
Deadhesion and delamination • Absolute temperature 




Corrosion • Absolute temperature 
• Relative humidity 
• Contaminants 
Electromigration  • Current density 
• Absolute temperature  and 
temperature gradients 
Electron-hole pair generation • Radiation and dose rate 
Popcorning • Relative humidity followed by 
thermal shock 
2.5.1 Determine acceleration loads and duration of tests: 
Based on the dominant failure mechanisms and the critical failure sites found in the 
physical analysis and virtual remaining life assessment, environmental loads are selected 
that will precipitate the mechanisms. The environmental loads needed for accelerated 
testing will dictate the type of environmental testing equipment needed.  For the 
accelerated test, failure needs to be defined based on the objectives of the test. Failure can 
be defined when an electrical parameter (i.e. voltage, resistance, current) is beyond 
specification or when the product ceases to operate (i.e. electrical open).  A parameter 
that is beyond specification may be caused by an intermittent failure, where the product 
continues to operate but cumulative effects will grow to until the product ceases to 
operate.  A failure that causes the product not to operate occurs when the stress level 
exceeds the threshold product strength. Examples of the threshold strengths are the 
tensile strength of a brittle material or the temperature level at which a component begins 
to malfunction. The failure detection scheme chosen for the testing need to be able to 
detect the defined failure. Failure detection and monitoring schemes need to be developed 
for the notification of a failure. The failure detection scheme should be able to monitor 
the critical failure sites and their likely failure modes. Characterizing the product 
response over the accelerated test loads enables insight into the interaction effects 
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between the applied environmental loads. The specimen characterization enables a 
prediction of the response of the specimen under accelerated test loads.  If the loading 
profiles of the overstress test are similar to the selected test loads then the data for the 
specimen response characterization can be collected over the entire accelerated load 
range of the overstress test.  
2.5.2 Perform accelerated testing and analyze results: 
The test specimens are exposed to the accelerated tests. Monitoring of the test specimens 
during accelerated testing provides a time-to-failure. The test failures should be 
documented by recording when, where, what, the load level, and pictures of the failure. 
Each test failure should be analyzed to determine the root cause failure mechanism. The 
precipitated failure modes and mechanisms of the accelerated tests should correspond to 
the failure modes and mechanisms predicted to occur..A reliability assessment is made 
based on the test results and the objectives of the product assessment. A failure free 
operating period, failure rate, or mean time to failure may be found by statistical analysis 
given enough samples and the test objectives. The acceleration factor calculated in 
section can be used to quantitatively extrapolate a time-to-failure from the accelerated 
test environment to the field application environment.  The assessment can serve the 
purposes of customer confidence, product development decisions, risk identification, 
warranties, and certification and regulatory concerns.  
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3 Physical Analysis of Assemblies 
3.1 Investigation of degradation, quality in assemblies through 
nondestructive and destructive means  
3.1.1 Disassembly and boards for inspection 
Disassembly was performed on one of the Analog Servo Power Amplifiers.  Physical 
analysis was performed on two of the circuit card assemblies (CCAs), identification 
numbers 2559013 and 2559022, which were removed from the module (see Figure-
Figure 3-1-Figure 3-3), during the complete teardown of the unit.  
 
Table 3-1:  Board Identification 
Board Identification 
Number 
Name of CCA Analysis 




2 2559022 Electronics Interface 
Board 
Visual inspection 
During the teardown, the following observations were made: 
• Irreversible fasteners were used to secure assembly 
• Conformal coating covering the boards and components 
• Wires were bundled together and attached to the board with adhesive; no damage 
was observed 
• Adhesive was also used to secure the parts to the boards 
• There was limited physical working dimensions 
Inspections were performed in accordance with:  
• MSFC-STD-136 (June 11, 1971) Parts Mounting Design Requirements for 
Soldered Printed wiring Board Assemblies 11, and  
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• NASA-STD-8739.2 (August 31, 1999) Workmanship Standard for Surface Mount 
Technology, Chapter 12 12. 
• IPC-A-610 (Revision C, January 2000), Acceptability of Electronic Assemblies 
[4]; Class 31 
• ANSI/IPC-A-600 (Revision E August 1995), Acceptability of Printed Boards, 
Chapter 2 8  
The inspections investigated the boards, components, and interconnections.  These 
included: 
• Board edges 
• Base material 
• Solder joints, connector pins 
• Plated through holes 
• Solder resist 
• Dimensional characteristics 
• Coatings 
• Component damage 
• Bow and twist 
• Component mounting/securing 
1 It was assumed that this product is Class 3 (IPC-A-610 Revision C, 
January 2000) therefore; acceptance and conformance were based on 
this classification.  
 
Class 3 – High Reliability Electronics Products; Includes the equipment and products where continued 
performance or performance-on-demand is critical.  Equipment downtime cannot be tolerated, and the 
equipment must function when required, as in the case of life support items or flight control systems.  
Assemblies in this class are suitable for applications where high levels of assurance are required, service is 
essential, or the end-use environment may be uncommonly harsh. 
20 
 
3.1.2 Low Magnification Visual Inspection 
Based on Table 3-2 10, (Table 1-2 Inspection Magnification in section 1.8 Magnification 
Aids and Lighting, of IPC-A-610 Revision C, January 2000) along with the statement 
from MDR that the land widths are 0.030 inches, a magnification of 4X should be used 
(see highlighted section in table below).  Each of the two boards was inspected using 
hand held illuminated magnifiers of 5X magnification. A low magnification stereoscope 
(15 – 60X) was used for areas of interest where it was determined that higher 
magnification was needed. 
 
Table 3-2: Inspection Magnification 
3.1.3 Board Inspection  
(note that the boards are covered with conformal coating, hence observations are made 
through this covering) 
At 5X magnification, the assemblies were checked for:  
• Surface imperfections such as burrs, nicks, cut fibers, weave exposure or voids in 
the boards 
• Conformal coating coverage 
• Solder mask quality 
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• Subsurface imperfections such as foreign inclusions, measling/crazing, 
delamination between layers of the base material and/or between the base material 
and metal cladding, or laminate voids  
• Imperfections in the conductive circuitry such as reduction of conductor width or 
thickness due to nicks, pinholes, or scratches 
• Visible discoloration due to corrosion, contamination, overheating or electrical 
overstress (EOS) damage 
• Isolated metal particles 
• Board warpage (IPC-TM-650, number 2.4.22, procedure #1) using a flat glass 
plate and ceramic plated to elevate the sample so that it is supported only by the 
edges (see Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5). % bow = (0.085 -0.07)/5.1 = 0.3% for 
board identification number 2559022. The specification specifies a maximum of 
1.5%. For the other board, identification number 2559013, the % bow was 0.4%. 
The results of the board visual inspection yielded no criteria for rejection in the above 
areas examined.  
3.1.4 Dimensional Characteristic Compliance 
After 20 years of storage/use, based on the assembly drawings supplied by MDR 
(2559013.pdf 6and 2559022.pdf 7) for the two boards on which visual inspection was 
done, physical dimensions (as given in the layout and board drawings) that could be 
measured, were within the specified tolerances. Measurements for the conductor spacing 
(minimum: 0.027 inches), conductor width (minimum: 0.022 inches), plated-through-hole 
(PTH) diameter (inner diameter: 0.032 inches) and lead diameter (0.02 inches) were all in 
compliance with the guidelines in MSFC-STD-136 11.The specification states that 
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component hole diameter shall be a maximum of 0.015 inches larger than the nominal 
component lead diameter. Using the measurements for the conductor spacings and 
metallization width (not thickness), and PTH and pad external dimensions. Plated-
through-hole diameter (0.032 inches) minus the lead diameter (0.02 inches) is equal to 
0.012 inches.  This complies with the specification of < 0.015 inches. Minimum spacing 
between adjacent conductors for conformally coated boards shall be 0.0003 inches/peak 
volt.  Based on our measurements, conductor spacing (minimum – 0.027 inches), these 
boards can withstand a peak of 0.027/0.0003 = 90 volts. The solder pads for the surface 
mount components all appear to be longer than twice their width (see Figure 3-6). Some 
of the PTHs in board 2559013 did not have annular rings on the component side.  The 
fillets of the solder joints on the component side of the board would be smaller compared 
to the joints on the other side where there are annular rings (cross-sectioning needed to 
clearly view this).  A picture is included in the board DPA report subsection. 
3.1.5 Component Inspections1
From an external view, no anomalies were noted on any of the components inspected on 
the four boards. It was noted that some of the components were bent at the leads to 
accommodate limited space in the vertical direction (see Figure 3-7). In accordance with 
NASA-STD-8739.2, Chapter 12 – Quality Assurance Provisions, and MSFC-STD-136, 
inspections were conducted in the following applicable areas: 
Solder Paste Application (visual observation of location, amount, and alignment of solder 
with respect to pad, reject criteria given in paragraph A below) 
• Part Alignment 
1 note that the components are completely covered with conformal coating, hence observations made are 
through this covering 
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• Part Appearance 
• Soldered Interconnections 
The results of the visual inspection yielded no criteria for rejection in the above areas 
examined. 
The reject criteria are as follows: 
• Solder paste application 
• Solder paste bridging between lands 
• Isolated solder paste 
• Void in the solder paste (only external) 
• Solder paste misalignment that covers more than 25% of the open area between 
lands 
• Smeared solder paste bridging conductors 
Part Alignment 
• Piggy-backed or stacked parts  
• Chip parts have lateral overhang more than 25 percent the width of the part or 
inside overhang more than 50 percent of the end termination width 
• Chip part tilting exceeds 25 percent of part thickness 
Part Appearance 
• Improper tinning of part leads. 
• Part improperly supported or positioned (polarity, centering, planarity). 
• Part damaged (especially cracks in ceramic parts). 
• Cut, nicked, stretched, or scraped leads exposing base metal (except smooth 
impression marks resulting from bending tool holding forces). 
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• Flux residue. 
• Improper positioning of leads to solder pad for lap terminations. 
• Improper lead bending and cutting. 
• Spliced part leads. 
Soldered Interconnections 
• Cold solder connection. 
• Overheated solder connection. 
• Fractured solder connection (externally visible) 
• Poor wetting. 
• Blowholes, and pinholes  
• Insufficient solder 
• Splattering of flux or solder on adjacent areas 
• Contamination (e.g., lint, flux, dirt). 
• Dewetting. 
• Non-wetting. 
• Dull or frosty appearance. 
• Solder scratches. 
 
For impact of these defects, refer to Solders and Soldering, Fourth Edition, written by 
Howard H. Manko 15.  
3.1.6 Non operating Failure Mechanisms  
These failure mechanisms are to be considered during storage and non-powered Ferry 
Flight and ground transportation.  See “Long-Term Non-Operating Reliability of 
Electronic Products” 14 for more details.  It has been noted by MD Robotics that the 
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assemblies are stored in climate controlled atmosphere where they are free from 
contamination, corrosive gases, radiation, shock and vibration.  The temperature and 
humidity is kept under strict control. There are no specific recommendations regarding 
how long a printed board can be stored, or specific recommendations on temperature and 
humidity requirements for optimum storage conditions 13. The non-operating failure 
mechanisms examined are described. 
3.1.6.1 Corrosion 
Corrosion is defined as the chemical or electrochemical reaction of a metal with the 
surrounding environment. The continuation and rate of the corrosion process depend on 
the nature of the corrosion product. Conditions that accelerate corrosion include relative 
humidity, high temperatures, high contaminant concentrations, and the presence of dirt or 
dust, which can hold more moisture on the surface of the metal. Of these factors, relative 
humidity is the most important. Rapid acceleration of corrosion occurs beyond a critical 
value of relative humidity Corrosion also becomes more acute as product metallization 
tracks become narrower, and the separation between metallization tracks becomes closer. 
Since the boards and components are conformally coated, and no pits or nicks were 
observed during the visual inspection, it would be difficult for moisture to get to the 
metallic areas.  Also, the metallization tracks on the boards are relatively large (0.03”
compared to 0.003”[9]) and also widely spaced. These make failure due to corrosion 
unlikely. 
3.1.6.2 Shock and Vibration (also addressed by VQ) 
Shock and vibration are common accelerators of failure. The most frequent vibration-
induced failures include flexing of leads and interconnects and the dislodging or 
damaging of parts and structures, or foreign particles in electronics. The degree of failure 
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generally depends on the natural frequencies, deflections, and mechanical stresses within 
components and materials produced by the shock and vibration environment. If the 
mechanical stresses so produced are below the acceptable long-term safe working stress 
of the materials involved, failures should not occur acceptable safe levels. Non-operating 
vibration levels during storage, Ferry Flights, and ground transportation are not 
significantly large or long-lasting when compared with launches or vibration tests. Since 
all of the components, wires and the majority of the fasteners are secured by solithane 
adhesive, damage from shock or vibration in the storage environment is unlikely.  The 
effects of the solithane are not addressed in the virtual qualification, but would make 
things better (more secure parts). 
 
3.1.6.3 Thermal 
According to MDR, in a year’s period approximately 356 days are spent in storage, 
which amounts to a period of 7120 cycles for 20 years and the temperature ranges from 
27 to 17 °C. Approximately once every 3 missions, a Ferry Flight occurs over a 7 hour 
period with a temperature ranges from –40 to +35oC. The main failure mechanisms due 
to temperature excursions include fatigue and fracture of various package components, 
which occur primarily as a result of mismatches in the coefficients of thermal expansion 
(CTE) of the various materials that make up the assembly. This is covered in the virtual 
qualification section. 
3.1.6.4 Electrical 
Although perhaps not readily apparent, non-operating electronics can be subject to 
significant electrical failure mechanisms.  While electrostatic discharge (ESD) is the most 
common in storage/dormancy environments, electrical failure can also be caused from 
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static charging of dust particles and organic vapors. Since the metal traces on the boards 
are relatively large, 0.03 inches compared to 0.003 inches (the state of practice in 2000) 
the possibility of damage due to ESD is negligible since the charge is distributed 
uniformly over the conductive trace – the larger the trace, the smaller the charge density.  
For the components, although the visual inspection did not reveal any anomalies, 
electrical testing is necessary to verify their integrity. 
3.2 Key Findings and observations:  
None of the two visually inspected boards had anomalies based on the acceptance criteria 
of standards: IPC-A-610 (2000), ANSI/IPC-A-600 (1995), MSFC-STD-136 (1971), and 
NASA-STD-8739.2 (1999).  There is no observation, which would suggest a decrease in 
the expected life. Based on the observations during the teardown, in addition to the visual 
inspection observations, reworking the units is not recommend because: 
 The units are difficult to reassemble (screws, bolts and nuts hold the units together 
in such a way, that once taken apart, it is tough to reassemble them due to limited 
physical working dimensions). Since each unit may be assembled differently, 
“teardown procedure” as given by MD Robotics, may not be applicable to all 
units.  
 The wires and components, in particular transformers and transistors, on the 
boards are secured with an adhesive, which makes it difficult to remove them.   
 Based on the visual inspection, the PWB assemblies are robust and would 
probably not suffer from failure mechanisms normally incurred during storage 
such as electrostatic discharge (relatively large metallization lines and conductor 
spacing) corrosion due to moisture ingress (no defects in conformal coating which 
covers the board and components), fatigue or cracking due to thermal excursions 
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(no cracks, chips or nicks observed on board, parts or interconnections), and 
damage from shock and vibration (due to how the parts and boards are secured) .  
3.3 Conclusion 
From the visual inspection, no anomalies for the specified areas, were noted in any of the 
components or boards. These boards are of good quality, as seen by the external 
examination. The spacing and widths of the pads and traces are relatively large, making 
the PWB assemblies virtually immune to electro-chemical failure mechanisms.  Also, the 
intact and complete coverage of the conformal coating will help to ensure that no 
moisture gets in to start contamination which could lead to corrosion. Note that this 
inspection is only external, and does not address parameters that may be examined during 




Figure 3-1 : These photos show the component side (A) and solder side (B) of board #1, identification 
number 2559013. A red rectangular box in A highlights some of the components (transformers) that 
would be difficult to remove.  Also shown (see red arrow) is one of the PTHs that has not annular 
ring on this side.  A blue arrow in A shows the adhesive used to secure the parts and wires.  The 8 
mounting holes (see black arrows in B) make the board more vibration resistant. Visual inspection 





Figure 3-2:  This photo shows the component side of board #2, identification number 2559022. Visual 




Figure 3-3:  This photo shows the solder side of board #2, identification number 2559022. Visual 




Figure 3-4:  This photo shows the setup to measure board flatness. The board is suspended by its 
edges on ceramic plates on a flat glass plate. 






Figure 3-6:  This photo shows the length of a pad compared to the width (0.08/0.03 ~ 2.7 > 2) which is 
greater than twice the width, in compliance to the specification. 
Length of pad 




Figure 3-7:  This photo shows bent components on board #2.  This is done to facilitate small vertical 
clearances in these areas. 
 
3.4 Investigation of degradation through destructive analysis 
3.4.1 Destructive Physical Analysis of Selected Components 
The cross-sectioned components were two tantalum capacitors (removed from board 
number 2559017) and two transformers (removed from board 2559023) (Table 3-3) 
Table 3-3 Source of parts for DPA 
Board Number   Action 
2559017 DPA on two capacitors 
2559023 DPA on two transformers 
3.4.1.1 DPA procedure for the components 
Each component was visually inspected using a low magnification microscope (10 - 50 
X) and electrically tested. Since the transformers could not be removed from the board 
without risk of damage, the transformers were left on the board while the capacitors were 
removed. The components were then potted in a room-temperature cure epoxy resin 




board or part materials with respect to each other and also prevents chipping or edge 
rounding during cutting, grinding, and polishing.  The cure is done under vacuum to 
remove any trapped air present in the sample.  If air is trapped, it will cause bubbles to 
form in the epoxy resin and creating problems during the cross-sectional procedure and 
optical examinations. After the epoxy resin solidifies, sections of interest are cut out with 
a liquid cooled diamond edge-sectioning saw. An initial rough grind at 240 grit is used to 
remove material and get close to the area of interest.  The sample undergoes successive 
grinding steps using SiC grinding paper (Allied High Tech Products).  The grinding 
process moves on to a finer grit size only after all scratches from the previous grinding 
step have been removed.  Typically, a sequence of 240-600-200 grit is used.  The sample 
is then polished using 0.3 micron alumina (Allied High Tech Products).  Samples are 
thoroughly cleaned between each stage of sample preparation. Micrographs of the 
polished cross sections are taken using optical (15 to 1000X) and/or environmental 
scanning electron (ESEM) microscopy (used when larger magnifications or higher 
resolutions are required)  
3.4.1.2 Results of Preliminary Evaluation 
The results of the destructive physical examination do not reveal any problems of 
degradation with the capacitors or transformers. 
3.4.1.3 Electrical Testing 
Electrical testing of the components revealed that each was functional. None of the coils 
for the transformers was open or shorted (resistance in each coil was less than 1 ohm). 
The capacitance values and leakage currents for the capacitors were within specification 




Table 3-4  Source of partss for DPA 
Component Capacitance (mF) Specification (mF) 
Capacitor   Capacitor 4.89 4.7 ±
10%  
0.0 
Capacitor   Capacitor 4.89 4.7 ± 
10%  
0.0 
3.4.2 X-ray Analysis  
No anomalies or defects were observed in the X-rays of the components (see Figure 44 
and Figure 45). 
3.4.3 Evaluation of Rejection Criteria – Capacitor (MIL-STD-1580A [1], see 
Figure 46 for layout) 
A. Cracks extending through the glass header 
B. Tubulet filled with solder less than 25% of its length when solder-plated leads are 
used and less that 50% of its length when gold-plated leads are used. 
C. Voids in the tubulet solder or solder separation from the leads that reduces the 
solder fill requirements mentioned in “B.” 
D. Anode (tantalum slug) not parallel to case within 15 degrees. Voids in tubulet 
solder or solder separation from lead or tubulet that reduces the fill to less than 25% of 
tubulet height for solder plated leads and less that 50% of its length when gold-plated 
leads are used. 
E. Solder spikes inside unit or eyelet solder extending beyond bottom of tubulet. 
F. Broken or cracked anode lead weld. 
G. Anode immersed in solder that is less than 1/3 of its height. 
H. Anchor solder cracked or pulled away from anode slug. 
I. Solder buildup on inside of can with height greater than 0.50 mm (0.02 inches) 
resulting from solder rundown during sealing process. 
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J. Anode totally immersed in solder. 
K. Anode cracked, broken or distorted. 
L. Loose material 0.25 mm (0.01 inches) or large enough to bridge shortest distance 
between lead and can, or between tantalum pellet and can. 
M. Any defect that reduces the part reliability (e.g., bulges or dents in the case). 
N. Failure to meet external visual requirements. 
1. Cracks on the cracks seal. 
2. Cracked or cold solder joint around seal area. 
3. Flux or foreign material on anode lead and around seal area. 
 
None of the criteria that would cause the samples to be rejected were found in the 
capacitor cross-sections (see Figure 47 through Figure 51).  
 
3.4.4 Evaluation of Rejection Criteria – Transformers (MIL-STD-1580A [1] 
9) 
a. Wire size not in accordance with MIL–STD-981 and applicable specification or 
drawing. 
b. Interconnect ribbon not in accordance with applicable specification or drawing. 
c. Internal wire leads attached only by soldering with no evidence of mechanical 
anchoring. 
d. Wire windings that cross over other turns in going from one wound segment to 
adjacent segment. 
e. Nicks, kinks, reduction in wire cross-section, or evidence of other wire damage. 
f. Evidence of flux or other types of residues. 
g. Teflon tape 
h. Charred, crushed, discolored, or damaged wire insulation. 
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i. Repaired or spliced coil wire. 
j. Wire-to-lead termination connections that do not show a sufficient stress relief 
loop. 
k. Cold solder joints, or solder joints with no fillet around wire or termination. 
l. No evidence of weld tip indentation in welded joints. 
m. Cracks in welded joints. 
n. Loose or splattered weld. 
o. Lack of three (3) full nonoverlapping wraps of wire at each post termination. 
p. Stranded conductor wire at terminations that does not show pretinning or that 
shows large globulesof solder that obscure the wire contour, or wire swelling due to 
excess wicking. 
q. Solder that is not chemically Type Sn 60, Sn 62, or Sn 63 in accordance with QQ-
S-571 or (for wire gauges smaller than size No. 38) Sn 10 for Class S devices. 
r. Coils or other electronic components that show evidence of overheating. 
s. Fractures, cracks, or pinholes in solder joint. 
t. Solder joints with sharp tips or peaks or with a protruding, bare wire-end or bare 
strands of a conductor. 
u. Foreign or extraneous matter embedded in or adherent to wire joints, between 
windings, or cores, or thin impregnation. 
Conclusion 
Although the samples contain voids in the solder, and slight pin misalignment, no reason 
for rejection was found, based on the criteria set by Mil-Std-1580 and what was observed 








Figure 3-8These photos show the location on board number 2559017 from where the two capacitors 








Figure 3-9:  These photos show the location on board number 2559023 from where the two 
transformers for the DPA were removed (see red box in A).  Figure B shows an enlarged section with 






Figure 3-10:  These X-ray images show the layout for board number 2559017 in the area containing 






Figure 3-11:  This X-ray image shows the layout for board number 2559023 in the area containing 




Figure 3-12:  This schematic shows a typical solid tantalum capacitor (MIL-STD-1580A). 





1. Conductive paint 
2. Slug 
3. Carbon film 
4. Anode riser 
5. Seal assembly 
6. Seal assembly 
7. Seal assembly 
8. Permanganate 
9. Case 
10. Anode riser to lead lap 
weld 
11. Oxide coating 
12. Core 




Figure 3-13:  These photos show the cross-section top view of one of the tantalum capacitors.  In A, it 
can be observed that the pin is not exactly centered, and that there are some voids in the solder. B is 







Figure 3-14:  These photos show the cross-sectional side overview of one of the tantalum capacitors 
(A).  In B a void in the solder in the around the tantalum plug can be seen. In C a void in the solder 
in the tubulet is shown. 
120 mils




Figure 3-15:  These photos show the cross-section top view of one of the transformers. B, an 






Figure 3-16:  These photos show the cross-section top view of one of the transformers.  In B, it can be 







Figure 3-17: These photos show the cross-sectional side overview of one of the transformers.  B is an 






The life cycle loading for this project includes the environmental conditions that the 
boards are exposed during its complete life (e.g., testing, transportation, operation).  The 
number of missions undertaken by an individual unit in the first 20 years is 15 for this 
project.  Two profiles used for the simulation are:  
• 20 years of life based on the environment seen by the boards in the last 20 years 
of operation  
• 40 years of life, which includes the expected environment for the next 20 years of 
operation assuming an increased frequency of shuttle launch. 
The life cycle loading characteristics included both operating and non-operating 
conditions. The testing for units may be done in two stages. One stage is during the 
manufacture of the electronic modules (e.g., SPA, EEEU) and the other is during the 
assembly of the complete SRMS. The complete SRMS consists of electronic modules 
and mechanical hardware.  Where applicable, the environmental profiles are identified to 
be “module build” and “SRMS build.” 
4.1 Thermal Life cycle 
The thermal conditions are modeled for the SRMS unit, which had the worst 
environmental profile. The worst case refers to the Flight EEEU, which had to go 
undergo qualification (qualification is typically done only once after the initial 
manufacture for a unit not used in space missions) due to major design changes. 
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Figure 4-1:  Location of thermistors on the SRMS 
Figure 4-1 shows the location of the thermistors on the SRMS.  The ABE thermistor at 
the EEEU unit end was used to obtain operation thermal cycle data. 
Qualification (powered up):  Qualification is used to see if the unit can withstand space 
conditions.  It consists of 50.5 cycles.  The temperature profile experienced is between –
36 to 81°C.  Out of the 50.5 cycles, 26 are during module build.  The additional cycles 
were performed during SRMS build after the unit was redesigned.  The profile of this 





















Figure 4-2  Qualification temperature cycle 
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Acceptance (powered up): After assembly or rework, the units have to be requalified 
through acceptance tests to see if they are capable of undertaking the next mission.  1.5 
cycles of thermal cycling are undergone during the module build, 2 cycles are undergone 
during the SRMS build.  From the testing after missions, and following rework of the 
units, there have been 16 more thermal cycles, so the total is 20 cycles with temperatures 



















Figure 4-3  Acceptance temperature cycle 
Ferry flight (non-operating): The Ferry Flights need to be undertaken when the shuttle 
cannot land in Florida and it uses the alternate landing site of Edwards Air force Base in 
California.  This flight diversion takes place once in about every 3 missions so total 
number of ferry flights is 5 for 20-year operation.  The temperature profile experienced is 
























Figure 4-4 Ferry flight temperature cycle 
Storage (non-operating): Each SRMS spends approximately 356 days a year in climate 
controlled storage.  The temperature profile experienced is between 17 and 27ºC.  It is 
assumed that one temperature cycle occurs each day so the total number of cycles is 7120 




















Figure 4-5  Storage temperature cycle 
Operation (powered up): consists of 4 different operation cycles based on the 
environmental profile given by MD Robotics.  Figure 4-6 shows the profile of operation 
temperature cycle.  The four temperature cycles are as follows: 
Operation cycle 1: This cycle approximates the zone 1 shown in Figure 4-6.  The 
temperature range is from 2 to 10 °C.  Each cycle has 185 minutes-dwell time at 
maximum temperature, 175 minutes dwell time at minimum temperature, 720 minutes 
ramp from minimum to maximum temperature, 270 minutes ramp from maximum to 
minimum temperature.  There are 3 cycles in one mission.  In 15 missions over 20 years, 
the total number of cycles is 45. 
Operation cycle 2: This cycle approximates the zone 2 shown in Figure 4-6.  The 
temperature range is from 2 to 6 ºC.  Each cycle takes 1.5 hours broken up uniformly 
between dwell times at maximum and minimum temperature and the ramp up and the 
ramp down times.  There are 16 cycles in one mission of 12 days, so there are a total 
number of 192 cycles.  In 15 missions over 20 years, the total cycles are 2880. 
Operation cycle 3: This cycle approximates the zone 3 shown in Figure 4-6.  The 
temperature range is from 4 to 25 °C.  Each cycle has 60 minutes-dwell time at maximum 
temperature, 720 minutes dwell time at minimum temperature, 720 minutes ramp from 
minimum to maximum temperature, 720 minutes ramp from maximum to minimum 
temperature.  There are 2 cycles in one mission.  In 15 missions over 20 years, the total 
cycles are 30. 
Operation cycle 4: This cycle approximates the zone 4 shown in Figure 4-6.  The 
temperature range is from –6 to 4°C.  Each cycle takes 720 minutes-dwell time at 
maximum temperature, 360 minutes dwell time at minimum temperature, 360 minutes 
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ramp from minimum to maximum temperature, 360 minutes ramp from maximum to 
minimum temperature.  There are 2 cycles in one mission in 15 missions over 20 years 
the total number of cycles are 30. 
The temperature conditions given above are for the first 20 years.  It is expected that each 
SRMS would undertake 25 more missions in the next 20 years.  During the next 20 years, 
it will undergo 75 cycles more of operation temperature cycle 1, 4800 of operation 
temperature cycle 2, 50 of operation temperature cycle 3, 50 of operation temperature 
cycle 4, 7000 cycles more of storage, 16 cycles more of acceptance and 9 more ferry 
flight cycles. 
Figure 4-6  Operation temperature cycle example 
 
4.2 Vibration 
The vibration data given by MD Robotics follow the same build profile as that of thermal 
conditions.  Figure 4-7 shows the graphical description of vibration profiles.  From the 
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graphical description, it can be inferred that the Qualification for the End Effector is done 
only once and at the beginning.  The 20-year profile sees 4 acceptance, and 3 
qualification and acceptance vibration tests for the End Effector.  The acceptance 
vibration is performed 5 times for the End Effector electronics unit.  Each vibration 
profile is explained in detail below.  
End Effector Electronics unit acceptance vibration test (EEEU AVT): The End Effector 
Electronics Unit undergoes acceptance tests after construction or rework.  It is done for a 
period of 1 minute and since it is done 5 times a total time of 5 minutes is taken for 20 
year profile.  Table 4-1 EEEU AVT gives the power spectral density (PSD) values for the 
cycle at different frequencies.  
 
Table 4-1 EEEU AVT 























Figure 4-7: Graphical description of vibration profiles 
 
End Effector acceptance vibration test  (E/E AVT): This is acceptance vibration done for 
the whole End Effector assembly to confirm workmanship (quality of the work) of the 
unit after construction or rework.  This test is done 4 times for 15 missions; and the takes 
one minute each time.  Table 4-2gives the power spectral density (PSD) values for the 
cycle at different frequencies.  
 
Table 4-2: E/E AVT 









End Effector quality and acceptance vibration test  (E/E QAVT): This vibration cycle is 
performed during Qualification of the unit.  The purpose of QAVT is to prove that the 
Qualification unit is designed well enough to survive all AVT’s, which a flight unit will 
see.  It is done 3 times for 15 minutes each.  Table 4-3 gives the power spectral density 
(PSD) values for the cycle at different frequencies.  
 
Table 4-3: E/E QAVT 







End Effector qualification vibration test  (E/E QVT): This vibration cycle is performed 
during Qualification of the unit.  The purpose of QVT is to prove that the Qualification 
unit is designed well enough to survive all life vibrations, which a flight unit will see.  It 
is done once for 50 minutes.  Table 4-4 gives the power spectral density (PSD) values for 
the cycle at different frequencies.  
Table 4-4:  E/E QVT 








Operation vibration: This refers to the vibration that the boards are exposed to in a 
normal mission, it lasts for 5 seconds, and since there are total of 15 missions the total 
time taken is 75 seconds.  The PSD profile of the End Effector Electronics unit 
qualification vibration test (EEEU QVT) is used for operation profile because it is 
considered as an indicator of operation vibration.  Table 4-5 gives the power spectral 
density (PSD) values at different frequencies.  











The data for 40 years includes 8 more EEEU AVT’s and 125 (5 seconds per launch) 
seconds more for operation vibration. 
60
 
5 Failure Modes and Effects analysis 
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) was done  to identify the different failures 
and modes of failure that can occur at the component, subsystem, and system levels.  The 
FMEA was initially done based on the failures that have occurred and were observed 
during the physical analysis. FMEA identified temperature and vibration as the two loads 
that would possible cause maximum damage on the electronics. Table 5-1 gives a FMEA 
done on the system and second half of the table gives a complete listing of failure effects 
for space electronics. 
Table 5-1: FMEA table 
FAILURE MODES FAILURE LOADS AND EFFECTS 
Open circuit,unmating of contact surfaces of 
connectors. 
Vibration and  g forces  encountered during launch. 
Possible instability of transformers, corrosion of 
metallization, electrical open, shift in parametrics. 
High temperature(150 degree c) because of solar 
radiation. High temperature proximity of power 
sources where heavy electric currents have heating 
effects. 
Wire breakage and  broken leads.  
Effect of fretting or mechanical fatigue of 
interconnection materials. 
Cracks of voids around weld circumference. 
Weld at low heat produce too small spot weld size 
and inadequate weld strength under tension and 
shear. 
Open circuits, component failures, electrical 
resistance of wirebonds  increase significantly as a 
function of time and temperature. 
Reduction in contact efficiency when dissimilar 
metals are in contact. 
Thermal cycling causes the reduction in contact 
efficiency continued cycling  expansion and 
contradiction  may cause one part to slightly exceed 
its material elastic limit at one temperature extreme. 
Thermal fatigue cracking. Stresses imposed in solder joints during thermal 
cycling where free thermal expansion is partly or 
entirely restrained. 
Cleavage fracture caused due to formation  of 
intermetallics. 
Under high temperatures.
Formation of cracks due to  board distortion 
problems. 
High temperature may cause the base laminate of 
PCBs to rise above the glass transition temperature 
in turn causing the epoxy or the laminate to become 
soft  causing a relaxation of the support medium 
which is usually woven glass fibre thus causing 
board distortion. 
Failures (open circuit – solder joint) due to 
difference on expansion and contraction of PCB’s , 
component parts and conformal coating applied to 
assemblies. 
Caused due  to temperature cycling during 
qualification tests. 
Degradation of internal copper tracks to plated Caused by repeated thermal shocks by reworking of 
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through holes. joints (each application of hot soldering iron). 
 
Table 5-2: Listing of all possible failures and effects for space electronics 
Events of LCEP 
during which the 
load occurs 
Environment Principal effects Typical failures 
induced 










Insulation failure due to 
melting 
Alteration of electrical 
properties due to changes 
in resistance 
On chip failures 
(metallization migration, 
Kirkendall voiding in 
wirebonds, slow trapping, 
time dependent dielectric 
breakdown) 1820  
Melting of solder joints 
1921 
Unequal expansion of 
assemblies leading to 
fracture 19 
Ionic contamination 19 







Alteration of electrical 
properties due to changes 
in resistance 
Unequal expansion 
between components and 
board leading to fracture 
due to CTE (coefficient of 
thermal expansion) 
mismatch 
Increased brittleness of 
metals 








Delamination  182425 
Loss of electrical 
properties due to corrosion 
and chemical reactions 
Cracking in electronic 
parts due to moisture 
absorption 161823 
Reduction in electrical 
resistance due to 
conduction through 
moisture 
Storage Low relative humidity Desiccation 
Embrittlement 
Granulation 




Alteration of electrical 
properties 
“dusting” 
Operation High pressure Compression Structural collapse 
Penetration of sealing 
Interference with function 




strength of air 
 
Fracture of container 
Explosive expansion 
Alteration of electrical 
properties 
Loss of mechanical 
strength 
Insulation breakdown and 
arc-cover 
Corona and ozone 
formation 






Alteration of electrical 
properties 




Sand and dust Abrasion  
 Clogging 
Increased wear 
Interference with function 
Alteration of electrical 
properties 





Increased wear of 
electronic parts and 
assemblies 








Wind Force application 
Vibration 
Deposit of materials 
Heat loss (low velocity) 
Heat gain (low 
velocity) 
Structural collapse 
Loss of mechanical 
strength 
Mechanical interference 
and clogging 16 
Accelerated abrasion 16 
Accelerated low 
temperature effects (low 
velocity) 
Accelerated high 
temperature effects (high 
velocity) 
 
Operation FreezingRain Physical stress 





Mechanical stress due to 
CTE mismatch between 
structural components  
Increase in weight 
Change in electrical 





On chip failures 
(metallization corrosion, 
delamination) 182223 
Testing and Operation Temperature shock Mechanical stress Structural collapse or 
weakening 
Seal damage 







Alteration of chemical, 
physical and electrical 
properties 
Production of gases and 
secondary particles 
Operation Zero gravity 
 
Mechanical stress 
Absence of convection 
cooling 
Interruption of gravity 
dependant functions 









strength of air 
Rapid oxidation 
Alteration of chemical, 
physical and mechanical 
properties 






Rupture and cracking 
Structural collapse 




Alteration of physical, 
chemical and electrical 
properties 
 
Operation Acceleration Mechanical stress Structural collapse 
Testing and Operation Vibration Mechanical stress 
fatigue 
Loss of mechanical 
strength 
Interference with function 
Increased wear 
Structural collapse 
Operation Magnetic fields Induced magnetization Interference with function 





6 Virtual remaining life assessment  
The virtual remaining life assessment was performed using calcePWA software (26-36). 
Virtual remaining life assessment using calcePWA was conducted on two SPA boards 
(Power Switch Driver Off and Electronics Interface) and on two EEEU boards (Logic & 
Commutation and Power Conditioner). The steps of the virtual remaining life assessment 
are as follows:  
6.1 Design capture  
There was a marked difference in the design capture for the SPA and EEEU boards. The 
availability of the SPA boards made it possible for dimensions to be measured physically 
from the boards, however for the EEEU boards this was not possible.  For the EEEU 
parts, which were common with the SPA, the measured data from the SPA were used. 
For parts that were not common with the SPA, dimensions were taken from the MIL Spec 
or measured from the assembly drawings. Interconnect related dimensions such as solder 
joint area, and solder joint height were based on similar components in SPA.  Geometric 
calculations were made to obtain solder dimensions. For example, the solder joint area 
was found out using assuming that the area difference between the drill hole and the pad 
was approximately equal to the solder joint area. The drill hole diameter and pad 
diameter was given in the assembly drawings. 
Part Data: The part data entered in calcePWA consisted of information about the package 
type (e.g., gullwing, insertion mount), case material, placement orientation with regard to 
end of the board, part dimensions (e.g., length, width and thickness), weight, lead 
material and all the interconnect dimensions. Table 6-1 gives part data entered for four 
parts of the Electronics Interface board. The X and Y-axes were assigned by the user of 
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the software. Approximations were done for the part locations on the board based on the 
board assembly drawings, this was done to prevent part overlap in the board models. 
 
Table 6-1: Example of part data entered for Electronic Interface board parts 
 
MD Robotics part 
identification number 
Attributes 
Q2 U16 R66 D7 
Description Transistor Comparator Transistor Diode 
Interconnection type Insertion 
mount 
Gullwing Axial Axial 
Center of component 
to edge of board along 
X axis 
35 122.75 102.72 47.45 
Center of component 
to edge of board along 
Y-axis 
80.55 71.78 99.62 88.32 
Solder bond area 
(mm2) 
1.307 1.535 1.307 1.307 
Underfill material Silicon 
rubber 
Kapton tape Solithane Solithane 
Standoff height  (mm) 2.08 0.06 0.177 0.18 
Solder joint height 
(mm) 
0.50 0.20 0.559 0.559 
Power dissipated 
(Watts) 
0.36 0.15 0 0 
Length (mm) 4.5 4.5 3.9 4.5 
Width (mm) 5.9 6.4 1.3 1.5 
Thickness (mm) 6 6 1.3 1.5 
Lead material Alloy 42 Alloy 42 Alloy 42 Alloy 42 
Interconnect data: The interconnect data entered in calcePWA is included in part data and 
has information about the components standoff height, solder joint height, solder joint 
bond area, interconnection type (e.g., Insertion mount, gullwing), interconnection format 
(e.g., single-inline, dual inline) and interconnect dimensions (the dimensions of the leads, 
radius of bends, the thickness variations). Table 6-2 and Figure 6-1explain  the various 
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interconnect dimensions for Insertion mount and interconnects, Table 6-3 and Figure 6-2 
provide the same for gullwing interconnects. 
Board data: The board data entered in calcePWA include information about the board 
layers, thickness of layers, layer materials, metallization material, and percent 
metallization. The laminate material for all the four boards is polyamide. Copper is the 
metallization material and based on the surface area covered by copper on the board, the 
percentage of metallization is estimated.  Table 6-4 through Table 6-7 give the board 
layers and the percentage of copper present among these layers based on the surface area 
occupied by it. There is less than 100% copper even on the copper layers. To ensure that 
the total volume percentage adds up to 100% for each layer, it is assumed that the rest of 
the material is polyamide and polyamide is taken as the board material. The copper and 
polyamide material combination is used to estimate aggregate thermo -physical properties 
of the layers. 
 
Table 6-2: Interconnect dimensions for gullwing components 
Lead dimensions Explanations of the dimensions 
L2 Length between package body and 
transition point 
L1 Lead length after the transition point 
W2 Lead width prior to transition point 
W1 Lead width after to transition point 
T2 Lead thickness of segment 2 







Figure 6-1: Interconnect dimensions for Insertion mount components 
Table 6-3: Interconnect dimensions for gullwing components 
Lead dimensions Explanation of the dimensions 
L3 Length between package body and 1st bend 
R2 Radius of curvature of 1st bend in lead 
L2 Lead length between 1st bend and transition 
point 




Length on the pad after the bend 
R1 Radius of curvature at the foot 
W1 Lead width after to transition point 
T1 Lead thickness 
W2 Lead width prior to transition point 








Figure 6-2:Interconnect dimensions for gullwing components 
 
Table 6-4: Layers and materials of Power Switch Driver off board (SPA) 















0.889 Copper 32 
Table 6-5: Layers and materials of Electronic Interface board (SPA) 









0.889 Copper 20 
2 Polyamide 
(between copper 














0.889 Copper 98 
Table 6-6: Layers and materials of Logic and Commutation board (EEEU) 
























0.889 Copper 20 
Table 6-7: Layers and materials of Power Conditioner assembly board (EEEU) 

















0.889 Copper 15 
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6.2 Assumptions and difficulties in design capture for calcePWA 
When complete engineering data was not available, assumptions were made by CALCE 
and MD Robotics regarding inputs to the calcePWA models. The assumptions were made 
in those places where it was difficult or impossible to obtain or measure the dimension 
due to various constraints (e.g., presence of solithane layers)  
Assumptions made and changes made to be suited for modeling in calcePWA are:  
Early in the process, it was found that the assembly-drawing dimension could not be 
treated as “to the scale.”  For the SPA boards, the part dimensions were measured 
wherever possible. The transformers present in the Power switch driver off board were 
cylindrical in shape but had to be modeled as square because of inability of calcePWA to 
model cylindrical shapes.  Figure 6-3 and Figure 6-4 show how the transformer is 
modeled as a square shape.  These types of modifications were introduced by CALCE in 
other product models.  Based on the previous analysis it was found that this assumption 
does not introduce significant errors in life calculation. The part dimensions of the two 
EEEU boards (only those not common to the two SPA boards) were obtained through 
measurements from part drawings with the assumption that the dimensions in drawings 
were to scale. MD Robotics suggested that this level of error in dimensions will be 
acceptable. Power dissipation values were estimated by MD Robotics through voltage 
derating information, empirical circuit analysis, and other documents. Military 
specifications for parts were used for obtaining some dimensions.  It was found that the 
military specifications did not have unique part dimensions and could only be used in 
conjunction with other documents. 
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Figure 6-3: Power Switch Driver Off board 
Figure 6-4: Board model of Power Switch driver off board 
 
6.3 Life Cycle Environment and Operation Assessment 
The life cycle profile of the EEEU and SPA boards go through various thermal and 
vibration analyses. Life cycle environment and operation assessment transformation 
process of virtual remaining life assessment results in temperature and displacement 
profiles under various load conditions that are used in damage simulation. 
6.3.1 Thermal Loads 
calcePWA thermal analysis is based on the control volume theory and uses a finite 
difference approach. The thermal analysis program automatically discretizes the board, 
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based on the number of layers through the thickness and grid size specified on the planar 
surface of the board. The discretization process creates a three dimensional matrix of the 
nodes representing the cubic sections of each layer. Thermal resistances for each node are 
based on the layer material and the material inserts within the cubic region defined by 
individual nodes. When the thermal analysis is performed, the program calculates the 
node temperatures for each layer. The thermal analysis assumed conduction as the 
primary cooling method.  The powered on thermal profiles need the boards thermal 
analysis results at the temperature limits (e.g., qualification –36 and 81ºC).  
The temperatures for which boards are modeled are specified as uniform boundary 
conditions along all the edges. As an example, Figure 6-5 shows the temperature 
distribution across the Electronics Interface board at 81ºC.  
 
Figure 6-5: Temperature distribution across Electronics Interface (SPA) at 81º C. 
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6.3.2 Vibration Loads 
In calcePWA vibration analysis tool, the PWB is divided into number of Kirchoff plate 
elements (elements with three degrees of freedom, out of plane displacement, and 
rotation about both in-plane axes). The stiffness matrix and the consistent mass matrix of 
each material are determined using material properties information and variational 
methods. The elemental matrices are assembled into respective global matrices for the 
whole structure using material properties information and variational methods. Once the 
global stiffness and the mass matrices are calculated, the natural frequencies and the 
mode shapes are determined using eigenvalue and eigenvector extraction techniques. The 
loading conditions are based on how the boards are fastened to the whole unit.  The 
electronics interface board is fastened at 8 points by screws to the unit; these 8 points 
were taken in calcePWA as simply supported loading conditions.  The conditioner is 
fixed rigidly over a continuous length so the simply supported section is modeled across                                                                                                                                                                           
the complete connector length. Figure 6-6 shows the loading conditions of the electronic 
interface boards. Figure 6-7 shows locations of maximum curvature of the same board at 
natural frequency of 807 Hz, the maximum curvature is observed at the support points, 
the components near these points have the maximum vibration induced stress. Figure 6-8 
shows board displacement distribution across that board. 
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Figure 6-6: Position of supports for Electronics Interface 
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Figure 6-7: Vibration modes at natural board frequencies (807 Hz) of Electronics Interface (SPA) 
board 
Figure 6-8: Board displacement due to vibration of Electronics Interface (SPA) board  
6.4 Failure Risk Assessment  
calcePWA simulation results list damage to individual parts in terms of damage ratio 
(DR). Damage ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of cycles experienced to 
estimated number of cycles to failure.  When the DR value reaches one, the component is 
predicted to fail. Table 6-9 through Table 6-12 list summary of results for calcePWA 
simulation.  The first column of each table provides the MD Robotics part identification 
number.  The second and third column shows the damage ratio for the part with a 
precision to two decimal points for 20 and 40 years respectively.  The fourth column 
shows the interconnection type.  The last column shows the calcePWA failure model that 
is used to calculate the primary damage.  In each table, the 10 parts with maximum 
damage ratios are listed for each board starting with the part with maximum damage 
ratio. Table 6-9 details the simulation results for the Power Switch Driver Off board 
(SPA) for the first 20 and 40 years respectively.  For the first 20 years, the life cycle 
segment that causes cycle that causes the maximum damage is the qualification 
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temperature cycle. (The maximum accumulated damage is for capacitor N3C4, the other 
listed components have damage ratio in same order of magnitude). The cycles to failure 
estimate for the qualification temperature cycle is 4256.51 and its contribution to damage 
ratio is 0.01186 in the first 20 years (54.18% of total DR).  Similarly, the total DR can be 
found out by adding the individual damage ratios caused by each life profile segment, the 
storage has a DR of 0.006721, acceptance has a DR of 0.002935, the ferry flight has a 
DR of 0.000226, all the four operation cycles have a DR of 1.4812E-05, 4.702-E-05, 
6.9076E-05, 2.1291E-05 respectively.  Summing all of them up, the total DR for 20 years 
is 0.02189. The vibration DR is not taken into account because the DR is zero for all 
vibration cycles.  For the 40 years of operation, the storage temperature cycle becomes 
the dominant contributor to the total damage ratio. Table 6-10 details the simulation 
results for the Electronics Interface board (SPA) for the first 20 and 40 years respectively.  
The life cycle segment that causes cycle that causes the maximum damage in the first 20 
years is the qualification temperature cycle.  (The maximum accumulated damage is for 
connector P1, the other listed components have damage ratio in same order of 
magnitude).  The cycles to failure estimate for the qualification temperature cycle is 786 
and its contribution to damage ratio is 0.06424 in the first 20 years (95% of DR).  The 
qualification temperature cycle remains the most dominant one after 40 years of 
operation too. Table 6-11 details the simulation results for the Logic and Commutation 
board (EEEU) for the first 20 and 40 years respectively. The life cycle segment that 
causes cycle that causes the maximum damage for the first 20 years is the qualification 
temperature cycle.  (The maximum accumulated damage (0.15) is for the connector P1, 
the next 9 components have damage ratio significantly less than P1 and those are all in 
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same order of magnitude).  The cycles to failure estimate for the qualification cycle is 
405, its damage ratio is 0.1247 (85.62% of DR). The qualification cycle remains the most 
dominant one after 40 years of operation too. The failure model details are provided in 
appendix A.  Table 6-12 details the simulation results for the Power Conditioner board 
for the first 20 and 40 years respectively. The life cycle segment that causes cycle that 
causes the maximum damage is the qualification temperature cycle. (The maximum 
accumulated damage is for capacitor C5, the next 9 components have damage ratio in 
same order of magnitude).  The cycles to failure estimate, for the qualification cycle is 
4.669E+03, and its contribution to damage ratio is 0.0108 (53% of DR). For the 40 years 
of operation, the storage temperature cycle becomes the dominant contributor to the total 
damage ratio. The parts P1 of the Electronics Interface board and P1 of the Logic and 
commutation board are similar, but they have differing damage ratios because of the 
differences in their physical attributes (e.g., size of the connectors, number of pins). The 
factors that made a difference in the damage ratio are the qualification cycle and 
acceptance cycle. The qualification cycle produces a damage ratio of 0.064 in the logic 
and commutation while it is 0.014 for the Electronics Interface board, the acceptance 
cycle has a damage ratio of 0.019 for the Logic and Commutation board while it is 0.002 
for the Electronic Interface board the combination of these two factors make a difference 
in the DR.  The comparisons between the two connectors are shown in Table 6-8. 
Table 6-8:  Comparison of the two P1 Connectors on SPA and EEEU Boards 
Attributes P1 of the SPA P1 of EEEU 
Length (mm) 60.5 70 
Width (mm) 12.1 12.1 
Number of pins 40 50 
Joint height (mm) 0.559 0.559 
Package CTE (ºC) 2.34E-05 2.34E-05 
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Board CTE (ºC) 1.566E-05 1.566E-05 






for 20 years 
operation 
Damage ratio 




N3C4 0.02189 0.03133 Insertion 
mount 
N5C4 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
N1C4 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
N6C2 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
N1C2 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
N4C2 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
N3C2 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
N5C2 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
N2C2 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
N5C3 0.01 0.01 Insertion 
mount 















P1 0.0678 0.07121 Gullwing 
C9 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C2 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C7 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C4 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
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C6 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C11 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C33 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C37 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C31 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 















P1 0.14232 0.15967 Gullwing 
C11 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C18 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C22 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C16 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C19 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C4 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C15 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C14 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C34 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 















C5 0.02044 0.02958 Insertion 
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mount 
C12 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C1 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C7 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C3 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C4 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C2 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C13 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C9 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
C11 0.02 0.03 Insertion 
mount 
7 Accelerated testing 
Acceleration factor for estimating an enhanced rate of damage accumulation on the SPA 
board was calculated using the simulation results of the two SPA boards. The actual 
accelerated testing was done at MDR  the reason being  limitations  like limited thermal 
chamber time, longer dwell times (more time for cables to be connected) to be used so 
that it is possible to perform a full functional test at maximum and minimum temperature. 
The other reason was that we wanted to do accelerated thermal cycling to the point of 
failure of the part so accuracy of calcePWA simulation results could be established but 
MDR didn’t want to go the full length because they just wanted to simulated the life for 
next 20 years.   
Vibration accelerated testing done at MDR 
Vibration profiles from 2 sets of tests conducted were:  
 The first is the 1g (input) sine sweep.  The highest peak for the 309 unit was a 
~4G peak around 1400 Hz.  The highest peaks for 305 were a ~14G peak around 
81
700 Hz and a ~12G peak around 1100 Hz).  The highest peaks for 212 were 2Gs 
peaks around 650 Hz and 1400 Hz. 
 The second test was a 12.8Grms input profile (using the E/E QVT profile).  Note 
that the peaks roughly correspond to the locations seen in the sine sweep profiles.  
The vibration seen by the accelerometers mounted to the SPAs were 15.96G for 
SPA 309, 25.31G for SPA 305, and 14.74G for SPA 212. 
Observations of the tests were :  
 The SPA on face B (y-axis) generated the most amplification in the input 
vibration.  This would have been due to it being cantilevered slightly on the side 
and the narrow width of the SPA’s base in the drive axis for this configuration.   
 The SPA on face C was also cantilevered, but was driven in the length of the base, 
and had more stability which prevented the vibrations from being amplified as 
much.   
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Figure 7-1 : In picture above, the vibration axes are shown for the three SPAs that were vibrated.  
For the vibration profiles sent, the SPA 212 is on the top of the cube (unit Q / z-axis / face A), SPA 
305 is on the left-hand side (unit P / y-axis / face B), and SPA 309 is on the right-hand side (unit R / x-
axis / face C).   
 The SPA on top (face A / z-axis) had no significant cantilevering and did not 
greatly amplify the vibration input. 
Conclusions made from the testing were : 
 Amplifications were caused by the physical design of the units (materials and 
shape). 
 The amplification seen by the unit on top (z-axis) was not very significant, nor 
was there significant amplification for the x-axis unit.  Using this frame of 
reference, 7/10 SPA boards are in the x-y plane and the remaining 3 are the 
(small, well-secured) Power Switch boards in the y-z plane.  Although the y-axis 
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unit has significant amplification, this will not impact the boards since it is in-
plane with the boards.   
 
Table 7-1 Calculation of Remaining Life for boards 
Unit - Board and Critical Part DR for 1st 20 years 
(with qualification) 






SPA - Power Switch Driver Off board 
(N3C4) 
0.017 0.009 2184 
years 
SPA - Electronics Interface board (P1) 0.038 0.003 6413 
years 
EEEU - Logic & Commutation board 
(P1) 
0.089 0.014 1301 
years 
EEEU - Power Conditioner board (C5) 0.016 0.008 2460 
years 
THERMAL 
The thermal accelerate life testing was composed of three cycles of Baseline tests (with 
157-minute plateau durations) and 24 cycles of Functional tests (with 74-minute plateau 
durations).  The time/cycle totals were 464 minutes for each Baseline cycle and 298 
minutes for each Functional cycle.  Note EEEU underwent qualification testing in the 
first 20 years of life.  Three of the other EEEUs have not undergone qualification testing. 
Applying the Acceleration Factors (AFs) from the revised Tables 29 through 32 above, 
the total accelerated time accumulated would be equal to: 
For EEEU:  
# Functional cycles to make up 1st 20-years = 20*365*24*60/2854.587722/298 = 
12.35736 cycles 
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(12.35736 Functional cycles * 298 minutes * 2854.587722) + (11.64264 Functional 
cycles * 298 minutes * 39977.66579) + (3 Baseline cycles * 464 minutes * 29781.26944) 
= 362.77 years 
 For other EEEUs (without Qualification testing): 
# Functional cycles to make up 1st 20-years = 20*365*24*60/47555.62896/298 = 
0.7417664 cycles 
(0.74177 Functional cycles * 298 minutes * 47555.62896) + (23.25823 Functional cycles 
* 298 minutes * 39977.66579) + (3 Baseline cycles * 464 minutes * 29781.26944) = 
626.05 years 
 
SPA passed its first direct drive test at the hot temperature during the first 
(Baseline) cycle. Applying the Acceleration Factors and assuming that the damage 
accumulated was 0.75 of a Baseline cycle, the total accelerated time accumulated at that 
point would be equal to: 
For EEEU:  
(0.75 Baseline cycles * 464 minutes * 2126.518505) = 1.41 years 
 For other EEEUs (without Qualification testing): 
# Baseline cycles to make up 1st 20-years = 20*365*24*60/35426.45554/464 = 0.639499 
cycles 
(0.639499 Baseline cycles * 464 minutes * 35426.45554) + (0.110501 Baseline cycles * 
464 minutes * 29781.26944) = 22.91 years 
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 SPA failed its second direct drive test at the hot temperature during the third 
cycle.  Applying the Acceleration Factors from the revised Tables 29 through 32 above, 
and assuming that the damage accumulated was 1 Baseline cycle and 1.75 Functional 
cycles, the total accelerated time accumulated at that point would be equal to:
For EEEU:  
(1.75 Functional cycles * 298 minutes * 2854.587722) + (1 Baseline cycle * 464 minutes 
* 2126.518505) = 4.71 years 
 For other EEEUs (without Qualification testing): 
# Functional cycles to make up 1st 20-years = 20*365*24*60/47555.62896/298 = 
0.7417664 cycles 
(0.74177 Functional cycles * 298 minutes * 47555.62896) + (1.00823 Functional cycles 




It is difficult to rework or reassemble the SPA assembly.  Assuming that the EEEU 
assembly is built in similar manner, the EEEU will be difficult to rework or reassemble.  
The units are difficult to reassemble once taken apart due to limited physical working 
dimensions. The wires and components, in particular transformers and transistors, on the 
boards are secured with an adhesive that makes it difficult to remove them without 
damaging. There were no defects found in any of the boards or components during the 
external visual inspection when examined according to NASA and IPC standards. From 
the assessment of the environmental and operational profile, it is seen that large majority 
86
(>90%) of the time is spent in non-operating, controlled storage condition. The damage 
accumulated at interconnects after 20 years and 40 years of use is low with damage ratio 
below 0.05 for all parts except two.  After 20 years, the highest damage ratio of 0.15 was 
observed on a gullwing connector of the Logic and Commutation board of EEEU.  This 
analysis assumed nominal quality of boards, parts, and interconnects.  The virtual 
qualification results predict that the remaining life of the interconnects is greater than 20 
years (low damage ratios are found for 20 and 40 years of operation).  The results of the 
board cross-section may impact the life predictions from the virtual qualification but that 
cannot be quantified without test results. Qualification thermal cycling was the most 
damaging environment for all components in all the four boards for the first 20 years of 
operation, while the damage caused by vibration was negligible.  In the 40 years life 
profile, the effects of storage environment and operation cycles (number 2) begins to be 
dominant for some of the parts. From the simulation results, it is decided by MD 
Robotics that temperature cycling -50ºC to 100ºC is the most suitable accelerated test 
condition for accelerating damage accumulation. From visual inspection results, it can be 
seen that PWB assemblies are robust and would probably not suffer from any failure 
mechanisms normally incurred during storage such as electrostatic discharge, corrosion 
due to moisture ingress and, fatigue or cracking due to thermal excursions.  Cross section 
of the boards and interconnect revealed several quality problems such as voids in solder 
joints, pin misalignment, nodules in the plated insertion mount (PTH) walls, and copper 
foil thinning (Thinned area can cause a large increase in current density, and violate 
specifications. Further cross-sectional analysis is necessary to estimate the size of the 
affected area and if there area other existing similar defects, and then enable one to make 
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aprediction regarding the impact on reliability due to these defects).Results of the 
component DPA show they meet Mil-Std-1580 requirements.No non-operating reliability 
issues have been identified from the visual and destructive inspection. There is latent 
reliability issue with at least one of the tantalum capacitors.  Results of accelerated life 
test on tantalum capacitors suggest that one of the parts evaluated was potentially 
improperly labeled with respect to voltage rating or exhibits premature failure against 
established reliability level. 
9 Future Work 
 To obtain a better confidence on the remaining life of the system, the following work 
will be necessary: 
 More board cross sectioning for better understanding of the board quality and the 
interconnect characteristics. 
 The DPA of the components in significant numbers for better estimate of the 
component degradation/quality patterns. 
 Component level virtual remaining life assessment will be necessary. 




A remaining life assessment process has been developed which could be used for other 
systems and fields like avionics. The remaining life assessment used in this thesis uses 
the principle of stastical estimate, which is basically finding a small part of the system, 
that is the representative of the whole system. In our case we choose the EEEU unit as the 
representative of the SRMS. This concept can be used for RLA of other big systems and 
88
lot of time and money can be saved. The RLA process once done on the system gives a 
clear perspective of the failures and the causes of the failures, hence the results of the 
RLA process can be used as a benchmark for better design and reliability. The life cycle 
phases most detrimental to the electronics of the shuttle was determined and this 
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